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Abstract
The well-known Impossibility Theorem of Arrow asserts that any Generalized Social
Welfare Function (GSWF) with at least three alternatives, which satisfies Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity and is not a dictatorship, is necessarily non-
transitive. In 2002, Kalai asked whether one can obtain the following quantitative version of
the theorem: For any ǫ > 0, there exists δ = δ(ǫ) such that if a GSWF on three alternatives
satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of non-transitive outcome is at most δ, then
the GSWF is at most ǫ-far from being a dictatorship or from breaching the Unanimity
condition. In 2009, Mossel proved such quantitative version, with δ(ǫ) = exp(−C/ǫ21), and
generalized it to GSWFs with k alternatives, for all k ≥ 3.
In this paper we show that the quantitative version holds with δ(ǫ) = C · ǫ3, and that
this result is tight up to logarithmic factors. Furthermore, our result (like Mossel’s) gener-
alizes to GSWFs with k alternatives. Our proof is based on the works of Kalai and Mossel,
but uses also an additional ingredient: a combination of the Bonami-Beckner hypercon-
tractive inequality with a reverse hypercontractive inequality due to Borell, applied to find
simultaneously upper bounds and lower bounds on the “noise correlation” between Boolean
functions on the discrete cube.
1 Introduction
Consider an election procedure in which a society of n members selects a ranking amongst k
alternatives. In the voting process, each member of the society gives a ranking of the alternatives
(the ranking is a full linear ordering; that is, indifference between alternatives is not allowed).
The set of the rankings given by the individual members is called a profile. Given the profile,
the ranking of the society is determined according to some function, called a generalized social
welfare function (GSWF).
The GSWF is a function F : (Sk)
n → {0, 1}(k2), where Sk is the set of linear orderings
on k elements. In other words, given the profile consisting of linear orderings supplied by the
voters, the function determines the preference of the society amongst each of the
(k
2
)
pairs of
alternatives. If the output of F can be represented as a full linear ordering of the k alternatives,
then F is called a social welfare function (SWF).
∗The author was partially supported by the Adams Fellowship Program of the Israeli Academy of Sciences
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Throughout this paper we consider GSWFs satisfying the Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives (IIA) condition: For any pair of alternatives A and B, the preference of the entire
society between A and B depends only on the preference of each individual voter between A
and B. This natural condition on GSWFs can be traced back to Condorcet [6].
The Condorcet’s paradox demonstrates that if the number of alternatives is at least three
and the GSWF is based on the majority rule amongst every pair of alternatives, then there exist
profiles for which the voting procedure cannot yield a full order relation. That is, there exist
alternatives A,B, and C, such that the majority of the society prefers A over B, the majority
prefers B over C, and the majority prefers C over A. Such situation is called non-transitive
outcome of the election.
In his well-known Impossibility theorem [1], Arrow showed that such paradox occurs for any
“reasonable” GSWF satisfying the IIA condition:
Theorem 1.1 (Arrow). Consider a generalized social welfare function F with at least three
alternatives. If the following conditions are satisfied:
• The IIA condition,
• Unanimity — if all the members of the society prefer some alternative A over another
alternative B, then A is preferred over B in the outcome of F ,
• F is not a dictatorship (that is, the preference of the society is not determined by a single
member),
then the probability of a non-transitive outcome is positive (i.e., there necessarily exists a profile
for which the outcome is non-transitive).
Since the existence of profiles leading to a non-transitive outcome has significant implica-
tions on voting procedures, an extensive research has been conducted in order to evaluate the
probability of non-transitive outcome for various GSWFs. Most of the results in this area are
summarized in [9]. In addition to its significance in Social Choice theory, this area of research
leads to interesting questions in probabilistic and extremal combinatorics (see [19]).
In 2002, Kalai [14] suggested an analytic approach to this study. He showed that for GSWFs
on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition, the probability of a non-transitive outcome
with respect to a uniform distribution of the individual preferences can be computed by a
formula related to the Fourier-Walsh expansion of the GSWF. Using this formula he presented
a new proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem under additional assumption of neutrality (i.e.,
invariance of the GSWF under permutation of the alternatives), and established upper bounds
on the probability of non-transitive outcome for specific classes of GSWFs.
While providing an analytic proof to Arrow’s theorem does not seem such an important goal
(as there are several simple proofs of it, see [10]), Kalai aimed at establishing a quantitative
version of the theorem. Such version would show that for any ǫ > 0, there exists δ = δ(ǫ)
such that if a GSWF on three alternatives satisfies the IIA condition and its probability of
non-transitive outcome is at most δ, then the GSWF is at most ǫ-far from being a dictatorship
or from breaching the Unanimity condition. Kalai indeed proved such statement for neutral
GSWFs on three alternatives, with δ(ǫ) = C · ǫ for a universal constant C.
Kalai [15] asked whether his techniques can be extended to general GSWFs, and suggested
to use the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality [4, 3] in order to get such an extension.
However, Keller [17] showed by an example that a direct extension cannot hold – if there exists
2
δ(ǫ) as above, then it cannot depend linearly on ǫ. Keller asked whether for general GSWFs on
three alternatives, a quantitative version holds with δ(ǫ) = C · ǫ2.
A few months ago Mossel [20] succeeded to prove a quantitative version of Arrow’s theorem
for general GSWFs on three alternatives. Furthermore, he generalized his result to GSWFs on
more than three alternatives, and to more general probability distributions on the individual
preferences. Unlike Kalai’s techniques, Mossel’s proof is quite complex. While Kalai’s proof
uses only simple analytic tools but no combinatorial tools, Mossel’s proof extends and exploits
a combinatorial proof of Arrow’s theorem given by Barbera [2]. Furthermore, it uses “heavier”
analytic tools, including a reverse hypercontractive inequality of Borell [5] and a non-linear
invariance principle introduced by Mossel et al. [19]. The only drawback in Mossel’s result is
the dependence of δ on ǫ: δ(ǫ) = exp(−C/ǫ21) for a universal constant C, which seems far
from being optimal. Mossel conjectured that the “correct” dependence of δ on ǫ should be
polynomial.1
In this paper we present a tight quantitative version of Arrow’s theorem for general GSWFs.
We show that the dependence of δ on ǫ is indeed polynomial, and compute the exact dependence,
up to logarithmic factors.
Before we present our results, we should specify the notion of “the distance of a GSWF
on k alternatives satisfying the IIA condition from a dictatorship or from breaching the Una-
nimity condition”. We consider two different definitions of this notion. In both definitions, the
underlying probability measure is the uniform measure on (Sk)
n (the set of all possible profiles).
The first definition measures the distance of the GSWF under examination from the family of
GSWFs on k alternatives which satisfy the IIA condition and whose output is always transitive.
This family was partially characterized by Wilson [22], and fully characterized by Mossel [20].
It essentially consists of combinations of dictatorships with constant functions (see Section 2.3
for the exact characterization).
Definition 1.2. Denote by Fk(n) the family of GSWFs on k alternatives which satisfy the IIA
condition and whose output is always transitive. For a GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies
the IIA condition, let
D1(F ) = min
G∈Fk(n)
Pr[F 6= G].
We note that this is the definition that was used in [20]. Our main result with respect to
this definition is the following:
Theorem 1.3. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any k and for any GSWF F
on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in
F is at most
δ(ǫ) = C · (ǫ/k2)3 ,
then D1(F ) ≤ ǫ.
For the second definition, we note that a GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA
condition actually consists of
(k
2
)
independent Boolean functions Fij that represent the choice
functions amongst the pairs of alternatives (i, j) (for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k). The second definition is
given in terms of these functions.
1We note that Mossel also obtained another variant of his theorem, in which the dependence of δ on ǫ is
δ(ǫ) = Cǫ3n−3, where n is the number of voters, and C is a “decent” constant. As follows from our results
presented below, this variant is essentially tight for very small values of ǫ (dependent on n). Moreover, for
certain choices of parameters (specifically, “relatively small” n and ǫ very small as a function of n), this result
gives a stronger bound than our result, due to the better value of the constant.
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Definition 1.4. Denote by G2(n) the set of constant functions and dictatorships on two alter-
natives. For a GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, let
D2(F ) = min
1≤i<j≤k
min
G∈G2(n)
Pr[Fij 6= G],
where {Fij}1≤i<j≤k are as defined above.
Our main result with respect to this definition is the following:
Theorem 1.5. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any k and for any GSWF F
on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in
F is at most
δ(ǫ) = C · ǫ
9(
√
log2(1/ǫ)+1/3)
2
8 log2(1/ǫ) , (1)
then D2(F ) ≤ ǫ.
Note that for small values of ǫ, the exponent of ǫ in (1) tends to 9/8.
We show that the dependence of δ on ǫ in Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 is tight, up to logarithmic
factors in ǫ. The examples showing the tightness are GSWFs on three alternatives, in which all
the three choice functions F12, F23, and F13 are monotone threshold functions. In the example
of Theorem 1.3, the expectations of the choice functions are 0, 1− ǫ, 1− ǫ (in particular, one of
the functions is constant!), and in the example of Theorem 1.5, the expectations are ǫ, 1/2, 1−ǫ.
As in the works of Kalai and Mossel, the techniques we use are mainly analytic. Our proof
essentially consists of three steps:
1. We consider a GSWF F on three alternatives, and use a modification of Kalai’s formula
to express the probability of non-transitive outcome as a linear combination of “noise
correlations” between the Boolean functions F12, F23, and F13 (see Section 2.2 for the
definition of noise correlation).
2. We show that if at least one of the functions F12, F23, and F13 is close enough to a constant
function, then the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality [4, 3] and a reverse hy-
percontractive inequality due to Borell [5] can be applied to obtain simultaneously upper
bounds and lower bounds on the noise correlations. Combination of these bounds yields
a lower bound on the probability of non-transitive outcome in terms of D1(F ) or D2(F ).
3. To complete the proof, we use the techniques of Mossel to “cover” all the remaining cases
(i.e., functions with D1(F ) or D2(F ) greater than a fixed constant, etc.)
We note that since in the case where D1(F ) or D2(F ) is greater than a fixed constant we
use Mossel’s result as a black box, the value of the constant we obtain in the dependence of δ(ǫ)
on ǫ is extremely low, and seems to be very far from optimality. Extension of our techniques
to cover all the cases would make the proof free of non-linear invariance arguments, and lead
to a “decent” value of the constant. This is one of the main open problems left in our paper.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the tools used in the later
sections. In Section 3 we prove our main lemma. We deduce Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 from the
main lemma in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the tightness of our results. We conclude the
paper with questions for further research in Section 6.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we present the tools used in the next sections. First we describe the Fourier-
Walsh expansion of functions on the discrete cube. We continue with the noise operator and the
hypercontractive inequalities of Bonami-Beckner and of Borell. Finally, we cite the statements
from Mossel’s proof of the quantitative Arrow theorem [20] that are used as a black box in our
proof.
2.1 Fourier-Walsh Expansion of Functions on the Discrete Cube
Throughout the paper we consider the discrete cube Ω = {0, 1}n, endowed with the uniform
measure µ. Elements of Ω are represented either by binary vectors of length n, or by subsets
of {1, 2, . . . , n}. Denote the set of all real-valued functions on Ω by X. The inner product of
functions f, g ∈ X is defined as usual as
〈f, g〉 = Eµ[fg] = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)g(x).
The Rademacher functions {ri}ni=1, defined as ri(x1, . . . , xn) = 2xi− 1, constitute an orthonor-
mal system in X. Moreover, this system can be completed to an orthonormal basis in X by
defining
rS =
∏
i∈S
ri,
for all S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. Every function f ∈ X can be represented by its Fourier expansion with
respect to the system {rS}S⊂{1,...,n}:
f =
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
〈f, rS〉rS .
This representation is called the Fourier-Walsh expansion of f . The coefficients in this expansion
are denoted by
fˆ(S) = 〈f, rS〉.
The Fourier-Walsh expansion allows to adapt tools from classical harmonic analysis to the
discrete setting, and to use them in the study of Boolean functions. Since the introduction
of such analytic methods in the landmark paper of Kahn, Kalai, and Linial [13] in 1988, they
were intensively studied, and led to applications in numerous fields, including combinatorics,
theoretical computer science, social choice theory, mathematical physics, etc. (see, e.g., the
survey [16]).
The most basic analytic tool we use is the Parseval identity, asserting that for all f, g ∈ X,
〈f, g〉 =
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
fˆ(S)gˆ(S),
and in particular,
∑
S⊂{1,...,n} fˆ(S)
2 = ||f ||22, for any f ∈ X.
The next simple tool we use is the close relation between the Fourier-Walsh expansions of a
function and of the respective dual function.
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Definition 2.1. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The dual function of f , which we denote by f¯ :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}, is defined by
f¯(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1− f(1− x1, 1− x2, . . . , 1− xn).
Claim 2.2. Consider the Fourier-Walsh expansions of a Boolean function f and its dual func-
tion f¯ . For any S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |S| ≥ 1,
̂¯f(S) = (−1)|S|−1fˆ(S). (2)
The simple proof of the claim is omitted. We use also a variant of the dual function: f ′(x) =
1− f¯(x), defined as
f ′(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = f(1− x1, 1− x2, . . . , 1− xn).
Similarly to Claim 2.2, it is easy to see that for any |S| ≥ 1,
fˆ ′(S) = (−1)|S|fˆ(S). (3)
In Kalai’s proof of the quantitative Arrow theorem for neutral GSWFs [14], only the most basic
analytic tools (like the Parseval identity) were used. Following the proof of Mossel [20], we use
also more advanced analytic tools, related to the noise operator presented below.
2.2 The Noise Operator and Hypercontractive Inequalities
The noise operator, defined in [3, 4], is a convolution operator that represents the application
of the function on a slightly perturbed input.
Definition 2.3. For x ∈ {0, 1}n, the ǫ-noise perturbation of x, denoted by Nǫ(x), is a distribu-
tion obtained from x by independently keeping each coordinate of x unchanged with probability
1− ǫ, and replacing it by a random value with probability ǫ.
Definition 2.4. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. For 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, the noise operator Tǫ applied to f is
defined by
Tǫf(x) = Ey∼N1−ǫ(x)[f(y)].
It is easy to see that the noise operator has a convenient representation in terms of the Fourier-
Walsh expansion:
Claim 2.5. Consider a function f on the discrete cube with a Fourier-Walsh expansion f =∑
S fˆ(S)rS . The Fourier-Walsh expansion of Tǫf is given by:
Tǫf =
∑
S
ǫ|S|fˆ(S)rS . (4)
Since Tǫf represents the application of f on a noisy variant of the input, it makes sense to define
the ǫ-noise correlation of two functions f and g as 〈Tǫf, g〉. Using the Parseval identity, we
get an equivalent definition in terms of the Fourier-Walsh expansion (note that the definition
is symmetric between f and g):
Definition 2.6. Given two functions f, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the ǫ-noise correlation of f, g is
〈Tǫf, g〉 =
∑
S⊂{1,2,...,n}
ǫ|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S). (5)
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In the proof of Lemma 3.2, we express the probability of non-transitive outcome in a GSWF
F on three alternatives in terms of the noise correlations between the Boolean choice functions
F12, F23, and F13. Then we obtain upper and lower bounds on the noise correlations using the
hypercontractive inequalities presented below.
The first hypercontractive inequality we use is the Bonami-Beckner inequality, discovered in-
dependently by Bonami [4] in 1970 and by Beckner [3] in 1975.
Theorem 2.7 (Bonami,Beckner). Let f : {0, 1}n → R, and let q1 ≥ q2 ≥ 1. Then
||Tǫf ||q1 ≤ ||f ||q2 , for all 0 ≤ ǫ ≤
(
q2 − 1
q1 − 1
)1/2
.
In particular,
||Tǫf ||2 ≤ ||f ||1+ǫ2 , for all 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
This inequality was first applied in a combinatorial context in [13], and since then it was used
in numerous papers in the field. We combine the Bonami-Beckner inequality with the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality to obtain an upper bound on the ǫ-noise correlation of Boolean functions.
The upper bound is presented here for ǫ = 1/3 since this is the case we use in the proof of
Lemma 3.2, but it can be immediately generalized to any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
Proposition 2.8. Let f, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and denote E[f ] = p1, and E[g] = p2. Then:∑
S
(
1
3
)|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S) ≤ min (p0.91 p0.52 , p0.751 p0.752 ) . (6)
Proof: By Claim 2.5, the Parseval identity, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the Bonami-
Beckner hypercontractive inequality, we get:∑
S
(
1
3
)|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S) = 〈T1/3f, g〉 ≤ ||T1/3f ||2||g||2 ≤ ||f ||1+1/9||g||2 = p0.91 p0.52 .
Similarly, ∑
S
(
1
3
)|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S) = 〈T(1/√3)f, T(1/√3)g〉 ≤ ||T(1/√3)f ||2||T(1/√3)g||2
≤ ||f ||1+1/3||g||1+1/3 = p0.751 p0.752 .
This completes the proof. 
The second hypercontractive inequality we use is a reverse hypercontractive inequality, due to
Borell [5]. This inequality asserts that under some conditions, a variant of the Bonami-Beckner
inequality holds in the inverse direction.
Theorem 2.9 (Borell). Let f : {0, 1}n → R+, and let q1 ≤ q2 ≤ 1. Then
||Tǫf ||q1 ≥ ||f ||q2 , for all 0 ≤ ǫ ≤
(
q2 − 1
q1 − 1
)1/2
.
7
Although Borell’s result dates back to 1982, it wasn’t used in the research of Boolean functions
until recent years. In the last few years, Borell’s inequality was used in several papers [7, 18, 20];
it seems to be a useful tool that has yet to be fully developed.
We use Borell’s inequality to obtain a lower bound on the ǫ-noise correlation of Boolean functions
through the following corollary, presented in ([18], Corollary 3.5):
Theorem 2.10. Let f, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. If E[f ] = p1, and E[g] = p2 = pα1 for some α ≥ 0,
then for all 0 < ǫ < 1,
∑
S
ǫ|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S) ≥ p1 · p(
√
α+ǫ)2/(1−ǫ2)
1 = p1 · p
(
√
α+ǫ)2
(1−ǫ2)α
2 . (7)
In the proof of Lemma 3.2, we apply Theorem 2.10 with α ≥ 1, and write the lower bound in
the form p1 · pβ2 . We use a simple observation regarding properties of β = (
√
α+ǫ)2
(1−ǫ2)α :
Observation 2.11. • As a function of α = logp1(p2), β is monotone decreasing.
• For all α ≥ 1, we have β ≤ 1+ǫ1−ǫ . When α→∞, we have β → 11−ǫ2 .
Finally, we use the following notation:
Notation 2.12. We denote by RHC(p1, p2) the lower bound obtained in Theorem 2.10 for
E[f ] = p1, E[g] = p2, and ǫ = 1/3. In particular, RHC(p, p) = p
3, and
RHC(1/2, p) =
1
2
· p 9(
√
α+1/3)2
8α , (8)
where α = log2(1/p). For a small value of p, the exponent tends to 9/8.
2.3 Mossel’s Quantitative Arrow Theorem
In the proofs of Theorems 1.3 and 1.5 we use (as a “black box”) three major components of
Mossel’s proof of his quantitative version of Arrow’s theorem [20]. The first is a quantitative
Arrow theorem for GSWFs on three alternatives:
Theorem 2.13 ([20], Theorem 8.1). There exists an absolute constant C such that for any
GSWF F on three alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive
outcome in F is at most
δ(ǫ) = exp(−C/ǫ21),
then D1(F ) ≤ ǫ.
We use this theorem only in the case where ǫ is bigger than some fixed constant. Thus, the
“bad” dependence of δ on ǫ affects our final result only by a constant factor.
The second component is a generic reduction lemma that allows to leverage results from GSWFs
on three alternatives to GSWFs on k alternatives, for all k ≥ 3. The reduction can be formulated
as follows:
Theorem 2.14 ([20], Theorem 9.1 and Remark 9.2). Suppose that there exists δ0(ǫ) such that
for any GSWF F on three alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of
non-transitive outcome in F is at most δ0(ǫ), then D1(F ) ≤ ǫ. Then we have the following
quantitative Arrow theorem for GSWFs on k alternatives:
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For any GSWF F on k alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-
transitive outcome in F is at most
δ(ǫ) = δ0
(
ǫ/k2
)
,
then D1(F ) ≤ ǫ.
The third component is a complete characterization of the set Fk(n) of GSWFs on k alternatives
that satisfy the IIA condition and whose output is always transitive. Though we use in our
proof only the characterization of F3(n), the result is presented here for a general k for the sake
of completeness.
Theorem 2.15 ([20], Theorem 1.2). The class Fk(n) consists exactly of all GSWFs F satisfying
the following: There exists a partition of the set of alternatives into disjoint sets A1, A2, . . . , Ar
such that:
• For any profile, F ranks all the alternatives in Ai above all the alternatives in Aj , for all
i < j.
• For all s such that |As| ≥ 3, the restriction of F to the alternatives in As is a dictatorship
(i.e., is equal either to the preference order of some voter j or to the reverse of such
order).
• For all s such that |As| = 2, the restriction of F to the alternatives in As is an arbitrary
non-constant function of the individual preferences between the two alternatives in As.
3 Proof of the Main Lemma
In this section we prove our main lemma, asserting that if F is a GSWF on three alternatives
that satisfies the IIA condition, and at least one of the Boolean choice functions F12, F23, and
F31 is “close enough” to a constant function, then the probability of non-transitive outcome
can be bounded from below in terms of D1(F ) and D2(F ). Throughout this section we use the
following notations:
Notation 3.1. The Boolean choice functions F12, F23, and F31 are denoted by f, g, and h,
respectively. This means that the preferences of the voters between alternatives 1 and 2 are
denoted by a vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, where xk = 1 if the k’th voter prefers alternative
1 over alternative 2, and xk = 0 otherwise. Then, f(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if in the output of F ,
alternative 1 is preferred over alternative 2, and f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 otherwise. The functions
g and h are defined similarly with respect to the pairs of alternatives (2, 3) and (3, 1). The
expectations of the choice functions are denoted by
E[f ] = p1, E[g] = p2, E[h] = p3.
For each i, we denote pi = min(pi, 1− pi), and let
D′2(F ) = min
1≤i≤3
pi.
Note that D′2(F ) measures the distance of the Boolean choice functions of F from the family of
constant functions. Finally, the probability of non-transitive outcome is denoted by P (F ).
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Now we can formulate our main lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Let F be a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition. If D′2(F ) ≤
2−500000, then
P (F ) ≥ 1
10
·max
(
RHC(D1(F )/2,D1(F )/2), RHC(D
′
2(F ), 1/2)
)
,
where D1(F ) is as defined in the introduction and RHC(·, ·) is as defined in Notation 2.12.
Proof: Our starting point is Kalai’s formula [14] for the probability of non-transitive outcome
in a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA condition:
P (F ) =p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1− p2)(1− p3)+
+
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S) +
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|gˆ(S)hˆ(S) +
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|hˆ(S)fˆ(S). (9)
The proof is divided into several cases, and in each case we use a different modification of
Formula (9). In the following, we assume w.l.o.g. that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p3. Moreover, we assume
w.l.o.g. that p1 ≤ 1/2, since otherwise we can replace f, g, h by the dual functions without
changing the value of the right hand side of (9).
3.1 Case 1: p1, p2 ≤ 1/2
First, we note that if p3 ≤ 1/2, then the assertion follows easily from Kalai’s Formula (9).
Indeed, since by assumption we have p1 < 2
−500000, it follows that (1 − p1)(1 − p2)(1 − p3) ≥
1
4(1−2−500000). On the other hand, by the Parseval identity and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
we have
|
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S)| ≤ 1
3
(
〈f, g〉 − p1p2
)
≤ 1
3
· 1
2
· 2−250000,
and similarly,
|
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|gˆ(S)hˆ(S)| ≤ 1
3
· 1
2
· 1
2
, and |
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|hˆ(S)fˆ(S)| ≤ 1
3
· 1
2
· 2−250000.
Thus, by Formula (9),
P (F ) ≥ 1
4
(1− 2−500000)− 1
12
− 2 · 1
3
· 1
2
· 2−250000 > 1/10.
Therefore, we can assume that p3 ≥ 1/2. Note that in this case, we have
D1(F ) ≤ 2(1 − p3). (10)
Indeed, define a GSWF G on three alternatives by the choice functions:
f ′ = G12 = 0 (constant) , g′ = G23 = g, h′ = G31 = 1 (constant) .
It is clear that G ∈ F3(n), since G always ranks alternative 1 at the bottom and thus its output
is always transitive, and
Pr[F 6= G] ≤ Pr[f 6= f ′] + Pr[g 6= g′] + Pr[h 6= h′] ≤ p1 + (1− p3) ≤ 2(1− p3).
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Therefore, D1(F ) ≤ D(F,G) ≤ 2(1− p3). Also, by the definition,
D′2(F ) = p1. (11)
We modify Formula (9) using the following identities:∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|fˆ(S)gˆ(S) =
∑
S 6=∅
(
1
3
)|S|fˆ ′(S)gˆ(S) = 〈T1/3f ′, g〉 − p1p2. (12)
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|gˆ(S)hˆ(S) =
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|̂¯g(S)̂¯h(S) =∑
S 6=∅
(
1
3
)|S|̂¯g(S)1̂− h(S)
= 〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 − (1− p2)(1− p3).
(13)
∑
S 6=∅
(−1
3
)|S|hˆ(S)fˆ(S) = 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 − p1p3 = 〈T1/3f ′, 1〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉 − p1p3
= p1 − p1p3 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1 − h〉.
(14)
All three identities follow immediately from basic properties of the dual function (e.g., Equa-
tions (2) and (3)) and the Parseval identity. Substituting Equations (12), (13), and (14) into
Formula (9), we get:
P (F ) =p1p2p3 + (1− p1)(1 − p2)(1− p3)+
+ 〈T1/3f ′, g〉 − p1p2 + 〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 − (1− p2)(1− p3) + p1 − p1p3 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1 − h〉 =
=〈T1/3f ′, g〉+ 〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉.
(15)
Equation (15) expresses P (F ) as a linear combination of “noise correlations” between the
functions f, g, h, which are obviously nonnegative. Thus, if we obtain a lower bound on the noise
correlations that appear in Equation (15) with a ‘+’ sign, and an upper bound on the correlation
that appears with a ‘-’ sign, we will get a lower bound on P (f). We shall obtain these bounds
using the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality and Borell’s reverse hypercontractive
inequality. We subdivide our case into two sub-cases.
3.1.1 Case 1a: 1− p3 < 1/32.
We bound 〈T1/3f ′, 1 − h〉 from above using the Bonami-Beckner hypercontractive inequality.
By Proposition 2.8, we get:
〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉 ≤ p0.751 (1− p3)0.75 ≤ (1− p3)1.5. (16)
We bound 〈T1/3g¯, 1 − h〉 from below using Borell’s reverse hypercontractive inequality. By
Theorem 2.10, we have
〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 ≥ RHC(1− p2, 1− p3).
In order to estimate RHC(1− p2, 1− p3), we write it in the form (1− p2) · (1− p3)β(α), where
α = log1−p2(1− p3). By Observation 2.11, β(α) is a monotone decreasing function of α. Since
by assumption, 1 − p2 > 31/32 and 1 − p3 < 1/32, we have α ≥ log31/32(1/32) = 109.16.
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Substituting the value α = 109.16 into the definition of β(α) and using the monotonicity of
β(α), we get β ≤ 1.198, and thus,
〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 ≥ (1− p2)(1 − p3)1.198 ≥
31
32
(1− p3)1.198. (17)
Combining Inequalities (16) and (17), we get
〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉 ≤ (1− p3)1.5 =
(32
31
(1− p3)0.302
)(31
32
(1− p3)1.198
)
≤
(32
31
(
1
32
)0.302
)
〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 ≤ 0.37〈T1/3 g¯, 1− h〉.
(18)
Finally, substituting into Equation (15) we get:
P (F ) = 〈T1/3f ′, g〉 + 〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉
≥ 〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉 ≥ 0.63〈T1/3 g¯, 1− h〉
≥ 0.63RHC(1 − p2, 1− p3) ≥ 0.63max (RHC(1− p3, 1− p3), RHC(1/2, p1)) ,
(19)
where the last inequality holds since 1− p2 ≥ 1/2 ≥ 1− p3 ≥ p1 and since RHC(·, ·) is clearly
non-decreasing in its arguments. The assertion of the lemma follows now from Inequalities (10)
and (11).
3.1.2 Case 1b: 1− p3 ≥ 1/32.
As in the previous case, we bound 〈T1/3f ′, 1−h〉 from above using the Bonami-Beckner hyper-
contractive inequality. By Proposition 2.8, we get:
〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉 ≤ p0.91 (1− p3)0.5 ≤ (1− p3)4.1, (20)
where the last inequality follows since by assumption p1 ≤ 2−500000, and in particular, p1 ≤
(1 − p3)4. In order to bound 〈T1/3g¯, 1 − h〉 from below we use the reverse hypercontractive
inequality. By Theorem 2.10, we have
〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 ≥ RHC(1− p2, 1− p3).
As in the previous case, we write RHC(1− p2, 1− p3) in the form (1− p2) · (1− p3)β(α). Since
by Observation 2.11, for any α ≥ 1, we have β(α) ≤ 1+ǫ1−ǫ = 2, we get
〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 ≥ (1− p2)(1 − p3)2 ≥ 0.5(1 − p3)2. (21)
Combination of Equations (20) and (21) yields
〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉 ≤ (1− p3)4.1 =
(
2(1 − p3)2.1
)(
0.5(1 − p3)2
)
≤ 2(1− p3)2.1〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 ≤ 0.5〈T1/3 g¯, 1− h〉,
where the last inequality follows since 1− p3 ≤ 1/2. Finally,
P (F ) = 〈T1/3f ′, g〉+ 〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉
≥ 〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉 ≥ 0.5〈T1/3g¯, 1− h〉 ≥ 0.5RHC(1− p2, 1− p3)
≥ 0.5max (RHC(1− p3, 1− p3), RHC(1/2, p1)) ,
(22)
as asserted. This completes the proof of Case 1.
12
3.2 Case 2: p1 ≤ 1/2 and p2 ≥ 1/2
In this case, we have
D1(F ) ≤ 2(1 − p2), (23)
since defining a GSWF G′ on three alternatives by the choice functions:
f ′′ = G′12 = 0 (constant) , g
′′ = G′23 = 1 (constant) , h
′′ = G′31 = h,
we get G′ ∈ F3(n), and D(F,G′) ≤ 2(1 − p2). Also, it is clear that like in Case 1,
D2(F ) ≤ D(f, const) = p1. (24)
This time we use a slightly different modification of Kalai’s formula. Specifically, we interchange
the roles of g and h in Equations (12), (13), and (14), and get the following modification of
Equation (15):
P (F ) = 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 + 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉. (25)
We subdivide this case into several sub-cases.
3.2.1 Case 2a: (1− p2) ≤ p0.454121 .
By Proposition 2.8, we get:
〈T1/3f ′, 1 − g〉 ≤ p0.91 (1− p2)0.5 ≤ p0.91 p0.227061 = p1.127061 . (26)
On the other hand, by Theorem 2.10, we have
〈T1/3f ′, h〉 + 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 ≥ RHC(p3, p1) +RHC(1− p3, 1− p2).
Since p1 ≤ 1− p2 and either p3 or 1− p3 is not less than 1/2, we get
〈T1/3f ′, h〉 + 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 ≥ RHC(1/2, p1) ≥ 0.5p1.126061 , (27)
where the last inequality follows from Observation 2.11 since p1 ≤ 2−500000. Combining In-
equalities (26) and (27) we get
〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉 ≤ p1.127061 = (2p0.0011 )(0.5p1.126061 ) ≤ 0.5(〈T1/3f ′, h〉+ 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉).
Finally,
P (F ) = 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 + 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉
≥ 0.5(〈T1/3f ′, h〉+ 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉) ≥ 0.5
(
RHC(p3, p1) +RHC(1− p3, 1 − p2)
)
≥ 0.5max
(
RHC(1− p2, 1− p2), RHC(1/2, p1)
)
,
(28)
where the last inequality holds since 1 − p3 ≥ 1 − p2. The assertion of the lemma follows now
from Inequalities (23) and (24).
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3.2.2 Case 2b: (1− p2) > p0.454121 and p¯3 ≥ p0.20021 .
The upper bound in this case is the same as in Case 2a:
〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉 ≤ p0.91 (1− p2)0.5. (29)
For the lower bound, we use the reverse hypercontractive inequality for the term 〈T1/3(1−g), h¯〉,
and get
〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 ≥ RHC(1− p3, 1− p2) ≥ (1− p3)(1− p2)2 ≥ p0.20021 (1− p2)2, (30)
where the second inequality follows from Observation 2.11, and the third inequality follows
from the assumption p¯3 ≥ p0.20021 . Combination of Inequality (29) with Inequality (30) yields:
〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉 ≤ p0.91 p0.52 =
(
p0.69981 p
−1.5
2
)(
p0.20021 (1− p2)2
)
≤ p0.018621 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 ≤ 0.5〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉,
where the second to last inequality follows from the assumption 1− p2 ≥ p0.454121 , and the last
inequality follows since p1 ≤ 2−500000. Finally, if p3 ≥ 1/2 then 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 ≥ RHC(1/2, p1),
and otherwise, 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 ≥ RHC(1/2, p1). In both cases,
P (F ) = 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 + (〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉)
≥ 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 + 0.5〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉
≥ 0.5max
(
RHC(1− p2, 1 − p2), RHC(1/2, p1)
)
,
(31)
and the assertion follows.
3.2.3 Case 2c: p3 ≤ p0.20021 .
In this case we use another modification of Kalai’s formula (9), resulting from the following
modification of Equation (25):
P (F ) = 〈T1/3f ′, h〉+ 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉
= 〈T1/3f ′, h〉+ (〈T1/3(1− g), 1〉 − 〈T1/3(1− g), 1 − h¯〉)− 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉
= (1− p2) + 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 − 〈T1/3(1− g), 1 − h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉.
(32)
By Proposition 2.8,
〈T1/3(1− g), 1 − h¯〉 ≤ (1− p2)0.9p0.53 ≤ (1− p2)0.9p0.10011 ≤ (1− p2)1.0001.
Similarly,
〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉 ≤ p0.91 (1− p2)0.5 ≤ (1− p2)1.4.
Hence,
〈T1/3(1− g), 1− h¯〉+ 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉 ≤ (1− p2)1.0001 +(1− p2)1.4 ≤ 2(1− p2)1.0001 ≤ 0.5(1− p2),
where the last inequality follows since
(1− p2)0.0001 ≤ p0.00013 ≤ p0.2002·0.00011 < 1/2.
Finally, by Equation (32),
P (F ) ≥ (1− p2)− 〈T1/3(1− g), 1 − h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉
≥ 0.5(1 − p2) ≥ 0.5max
(
RHC(1− p2, 1− p2), RHC(1/2, p1)
)
,
(33)
as asserted.
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3.2.4 Case 2d: 1− p3 ≤ p0.20021
We use yet another modification of Equation (25):
P (F ) = 〈T1/3f ′, h〉 + 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉
= (〈T1/3f ′, 1〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉) + 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉
= p1 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉+ 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉.
(34)
Similarly to Case 2c, we have
〈T1/3f ′, 1 − h〉 ≤ p0.91 (1− p3)0.5 ≤ p1.00011 ,
and 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉 ≤ p1.41 , and thus,
〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉+ 〈T1/3f ′, 1 − g〉 ≤ p1.00011 + p1.41 ≤ 0.5p1.
Therefore,
P (F ) = p1 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− h〉+ 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 − 〈T1/3f ′, 1− g〉
≥ 0.5p1 + 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 ≥ 0.5max
(
RHC(1− p2, 1− p2), RHC(1/2, p1)
)
.
(35)
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2. 
4 Proof of Theorems 1.3 and 1.5
In this section we present the proofs of Theorems 1.3 and 1.5. The proofs are based on
Lemma 3.2, but also rely heavily on several components of Mossel’s proof of his quantita-
tive version of Arrow’s theorem cited in Section 2.3. The general structure of both proofs is as
follows:
1. We consider first GSWFs on three alternatives, and examine several cases:
(a) If D1(F ) (resp., D2(F )) is greater than a fixed constant, we deduce the assertion
from Theorem 2.13.
(b) If F is close to a GSWF that always ranks one of the candidates at the top/bottom
(resp., if at least one of the Boolean choice functions of F is close to a constant
function), we deduce the assertion from Lemma 3.2.
(c) If F (resp., one of the Boolean choice functions of F ) is close to a dictatorship of the
i’th voter, we split F into six GSWFs {F σ}σ∈S3 according to the preferences of the
i’th voter. We further subdivide this case into two cases:
• If for all σ ∈ S3, D1(F σ) (resp., D′2(F σ)) is small, we get a contradiction (resp.,
show directly that P (F ) cannot be small).
• If there exists σ0 ∈ S3 such that D1(F σ0) (resp., D′2(F σ0)) is not small, we
deduce the assertion by applying Lemma 3.2 to the GSWF F σ0 .
2. We leverage the result to GSWFs on k alternatives, for all k ≥ 3. In the proof of
Theorem 1.3 this requires the reduction technique of Theorem 2.14, and in the proof of
Theorem 1.5, the generalization is immediate.
Since the proofs differ in many of the details, we present them separately. Throughout this
section, we use the notations defined at the beginning of Section 3.
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4.1 Proof of Theorem 1.3
Theorem 4.1. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any GSWF F on three
alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in F is
at most
δ(ǫ) = min(C,
1
50000
· ǫ3),
then D1(F ) ≤ ǫ.
Proof: It is clearly sufficient to prove that for any ǫ > 0, if D1(F ) = ǫ, then P (F ) ≥
min(C, 150000 · ǫ3), for a universal constant C. We shall prove this for
C = exp
(
− C
′
(2−500003)21
)
, (36)
where C ′ is the constant in Mossel’s Theorem 2.13.
Let F be a GSWF on three alternatives satisfying the IIA conditions, and denote the choice
functions of F by f, g, and h, as in the proof of Lemma 3.2. If D1(F ) ≥ 2−500003, then by
Theorem 2.13, P (F ) ≥ C. Thus, we may assume that D1(F ) < 2−500003.
Let G ∈ F3(n) satisfy Pr[F 6= G] = D1(F ) (such element exists by the definition of the distance
D1(F )). Denote the Boolean choice functions of G by f
′, g′, and h′. By Theorem 2.15, G either
always ranks one alternative at the top/bottom or is a dictatorship. If G always ranks one
alternative at the top/bottom, then at least two of the functions f ′, g′, and h′ are constant.
Assume w.l.o.g. that f ′ and g′ are constant. Since
D1(F ) = Pr[F 6= G] ≥ max
(
Pr[f 6= f ′],Pr[g 6= g′],Pr[h 6= h′]) ,
it follows that either E[f ] ≤ D1(F ) or E[f ] ≥ 1−D1(F ), and similarly for g. This implies that
D′2(F ) ≤ D1(F ) < 2−500003, and thus we can apply Lemma 3.2 to F and get
P (F ) ≥ 1
10
· RHC(D1(F )/2,D1(F )/2) ≥ 1
10
· (D1(F )/2)3 > 1
50000
·D1(F )3,
as asserted. Thus, we may assume that G is a dictatorship.
The following part of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.1 in [20]. W.l.o.g., we
assume that the output of G is determined by the first voter. We “split” the choice functions
according to the first voter. Let
f0(x2, x3, . . . , xn) = f(0, x2, x3, . . . , xn), f
1(x2, x3, . . . , xn) = f(1, x2, x3, . . . , xn),
and similarly for g and h. Furthermore, for any profile (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) ∈ Sn3 , denote
F σ1(σ2, σ3, . . . , σn) = F (σ1, σ2, σ3, . . . , σn),
and similarly forG. The Boolean choice functions of F σ are fa1 , ga2 , and ha3 , where (a1, a2, a3) ∈
{0, 1}3 represents the preference σ of the first voter (note that only six of the eight possible
combinations of (a1, a2, a3) represent elements of S3). Denote by f¯
a1 , g¯a2 , h¯a3 the choice func-
tions of Gσ. Since G is a dictatorship of the first voter, the functions f¯a1 , g¯a2 , and h¯a3 are
constant. Clearly, we have
D1(F ) = Pr[F 6= G] = 1
6
∑
σ∈S3
Pr[F σ 6= Gσ ], (37)
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and thus, for all σ ∈ S3,
Pr[F σ 6= Gσ] ≤ 6D1(F ).
Since
Pr[F σ 6= Gσ ] ≥ max (Pr[fa1 6= f¯a1 ],Pr[ga2 6= g¯a2 ],Pr[ha3 6= h¯a3 ]) ,
and since Gσ is constant, this implies that
E[fa1 ] ≤ 6D1(F ) or E[fa1 ] ≥ 1− 6D1(F ), (38)
and similarly for ga2 and ha3 .
The rest of the proof is divided into two cases:
• Case A: For all σ ∈ S3 we have D1(F σ) ≤ D1(F )/4.
• Case B: There exists σ0 ∈ S3 such that D1(F σ0) > D1(F )/4.
We first show that Case A leads to a contradiction by constructing a GSWF G′ ∈ F3(n) such
that Pr[F 6= G′] < D1(F ). Then we show that in Case B, the assertion of the theorem follows
by applying Lemma 3.2 to the function F σ0 .
Case A: Consider a GSWF G′ whose choice functions f ′′, g′′, and h′′ are defined as follows:
For a1 ∈ {0, 1},
f ′′(a1, x2, . . . , xn) =

1 (constant) , E[fa1 ] ≥ 1−D1(F )/4,
0 (constant) , E[fa1 ] ≤ D1(F )/4,
fa1 , otherwise,
and similarly for g′ and h′. We claim that the output of G′ is always transitive, and thus
G′ ∈ F3(n). Indeed, by assumption, for any σ ∈ S3, there exists G¯σ ∈ F3(n − 1) such that
Pr[F σ 6= G¯σ] ≤ D1(F )/4. The GSWF G¯σ cannot be a dictatorship since by Equation (38), the
choice functions fa1 , ga2 , and ha3 of F σ satisfy
E[fa1 ] ≤ 6D1(F ) or E[fa1 ] ≥ 1− 6D1(F ),
and thus, for any dictatorship H,
Pr[F σ 6= H] ≥ 1/2 − 6D1(F ) > 1/2 − 2500000.
Therefore, G¯σ always ranks one alternative at the top/bottom. Denote the choice functions of
G¯σ by f˜ , g˜, and h˜, and assume w.l.o.g. that G¯σ always ranks alternative 1 at the top, and thus
f˜ = 1 and h˜ = 0. Since
D1(F )/4 ≥ Pr[F σ 6= G¯σ ] ≥ max
(
Pr[fa1 6= f˜ ],Pr[ga2 6= g˜],Pr[ha3 6= h˜]
)
,
it follows that
E[fa1 ] ≥ 1−D1(F )/4, and E[ha3 ] ≤ D1(F )/4.
Hence, by the definition of G′, its choice functions satisfy f ′′ = 1 and h′′ = 0, which means that
G′ always ranks alternative 1 at the top, and is thus always transitive.
Therefore, G′ ∈ F3(n), and on the other hand, we have
Pr[F 6= G′] ≤ Pr[f 6= f ′′] + Pr[g 6= g′′] + Pr[h 6= h′′] ≤ 3 ·D1(F )/4 < D1(F ),
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contradicting the definition of D1(F ).
Case B: Let σ0 ∈ S3 be such that D1(F σ0) > D1(F )/4. By Equation (38), the choice functions
fa1 , ga2 , ha3 of F σ0 satisfy
E[fa1 ] ≤ 6D1(F ) or E[fa1 ] ≥ 1− 6D1(F ),
and thus (in the notation of Lemma 3.2), D′2(F
σ0) ≤ 6D1(F ) < 2−500000. Hence, we can apply
Lemma 3.2 to the GSWF Gσ0 , and get
P (F σ0) ≥ 1
10
·RHC(D1(F σ0)/2,D1(F σ0)/2) ≥ 1
10
(D1(F )/8)
3 =
1
5120
·D1(F )3.
Finally,
P (F ) =
1
6
∑
σ∈S3
P (F σ) ≥ 1
6
· P (F σ0) > 1
50000
D1(F )
3.
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
Theorem 1.3 follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 using Theorem 2.14 (the generic reduction
lemma of Mossel).
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1.5
Theorem 4.2. There exists an absolute constant C such that for any GSWF F on three
alternatives that satisfies the IIA condition, if the probability of non-transitive outcome in F is
at most
δ(ǫ) = min
(
C,
1
10000
· ǫ
9(
√
log2(1/ǫ)+1/3)
2
8 log2(1/ǫ)
)
, (39)
then D2(F ) ≤ ǫ.
Proof: By Equation (8), it is sufficient to prove that for any ǫ > 0, if D2(F ) = ǫ, then
P (F ) ≥ min
(
C,
1
5000
·RHC(1/2, ǫ)
)
,
for a universal constant C. We shall prove this for
C = exp
(
− C
′
(2−500003)21
)
, (40)
where C ′ is the constant in Mossel’s Theorem 2.13. Let F be a GSWF on three alternatives
satisfying the IIA conditions, and denote the choice functions of F by f, g, and h, as in the
proof of Lemma 3.2.
First we consider the case D2(F ) ≥ 2−500003. We show that in general, D1(F ) ≥ D2(F ),
and thus in this case we have D1(F ) ≥ D2(F ) ≥ 2−500003, which by Theorem 2.13 implies
that P (F ) ≥ C. Let G ∈ F3(n) satisfy Pr[F 6= G] = D1(F ), and denote the Boolean choice
functions of G by f ′, g′, and h′. Clearly,
D1(F ) = Pr[F 6= G] ≥ max
(
Pr[f 6= f ′],Pr[g 6= g′],Pr[h 6= h′]) . (41)
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By Theorem 2.15, G either always ranks one alternative at the top/bottom or is a dictatorship.
In the first case, at least two of the functions f ′, g′, and h′ are constant, and thus Equation (41)
implies that at least two of the functions f, g, and h are at most D1(F )-far from a constant
function. In the latter case, the functions f ′, g′, and h′ are dictatorships, and thus Equation (41)
implies that f, g, and h are at most D1(F )-far from a dictatorship. Hence, in both cases,
D2(F ) = min
1≤i<j≤3
min
G∈G2(n)
Pr[Fij 6= G] ≤ D1(F ),
as asserted.
Now we consider the case D2(F ) < 2
−500003. Assume w.l.o.g. that the minimal distance
minG∈G2(n) Pr[Fij 6= G] is obtained by the choice function f , and let f˜ ∈ G2(n) satisfy Pr[f 6=
f˜ ] = D2(F ). If f˜ is a constant function, then in the notations of Lemma 3.2, this implies that
D′2(F ) = D2(F ) < 2−500003, and thus we can apply Lemma 3.2 to F and get
P (F ) ≥ 1
10
·RHC(1/2,D′2(F )) >
1
5000
· RHC(1/2,D2(F )),
as asserted. Thus, we may assume that f˜ is a dictatorship.
Assume w.l.o.g. that f˜ is a dictatorship of the first voter. Define the functions F σ, f0, f1, g0, g1, h0,
and h1 as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, and let
f˜0(x2, x3, . . . , xn) = f˜(0, x2, x3, . . . , xn), and f˜
1(x2, x3, . . . , xn) = f˜(1, x2, x3, . . . , xn).
Clearly, we have
D2(F ) = Pr[f 6= f˜ ] = 1
2
(Pr[f0 6= f˜0] + Pr[f1 6= f˜1]), (42)
and thus, for a1 ∈ {0, 1},
Pr[fa1 6= f˜a1 ] ≤ 2D2(F ).
Since f˜0 and f˜1 are constant functions, this implies that
E[fa1 ] ≤ 2D2(F ) or E[fa1 ] ≥ 1− 2D2(F ). (43)
The rest of the proof is divided into two cases:
• Case A: For all σ ∈ S3 we have D′2(F σ) ≤ D2(F )/4.
• Case B: There exists σ0 ∈ S3 such that D′2(F σ0) > D2(F )/4.
Case A: In this case, for any σ ∈ S3, at least one of the choice functions of F σ is at most
D2(F )/4-far from a constant function. Note that if f
0 is at most D2(F )/4-far from a constant
function, then f1 must be at least 7D2(f)/4-far from a constant function, since otherwise, f is
less than D2(F )-far either from a constant function or from a dictatorship, contradicting the
definition of D2(F ). The same holds also for the pairs (g
0, g1) and (h0, h1). Thus, the only two
possibilities are that either the functions f1, g1, h1 or the functions f0, g0, h0 are simultaneously
at most D2(F )/4-far from a constant function. (For example, if f
1, g1, and h0 are at most
D2(F )/4-far from a constant function, then f
0, g0, and h1 are at least 7D2(F )/4-far from a
constant function, and thus, for the preference σ = (0, 0, 1), we have D′2(F
σ) ≥ 7D2(F )/4, a
contradiction. The other possibilities are discarded in a similar way). Assume w.l.o.g. that
f1, g1, and h1 are at most D2(F )/4-far from a constant function. Furthermore, since amongst
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the expectations E[f1],E[g1],E[h1], at least two are close to one or at least two are close to
zero, we can assume w.l.o.g. that
Pr[f1 6= 1] ≤ D2(F )/4, and Pr[g1 6= 1] ≤ D2(F )/4.
Consider the GSWF F σ0 for the preference σ0 = (1, 1, 0). Since h
0 is at least 7D2(F )/4-far
from the constant zero function, it follows that
P (F σ) ≥ Pr
profile ∈(S3)n−1
[(f1, g1, h0)(profile) = (1, 1, 1)]
≥ 7D2(F )/4 −D2(F )/4 −D2(F )/4 = 5D2(F )/4,
and thus,
P (F ) =
1
6
∑
σ∈S3
P (F σ) ≥ 1
6
· P (F σ0) ≥ 5
24
·D2(F ) > 1
5000
·RHC(1/2,D2(F )),
as asserted.
Case B: Let σ0 ∈ S3 be such that D′2(F σ0) > D2(F )/4. By Equation (43), the choice function
fa1 of F σ0 satisfies
E[fa1 ] ≤ 2D2(F ) or E[fa1 ] ≥ 1− 2D2(F ),
and thus, D′2(F σ0) ≤ 2D2(F ) < 2−500000. Hence, we can apply Lemma 3.2 to the GSWF Gσ0 ,
and get
P (F σ0) ≥ 1
10
· RHC(1/2,D′2(F σ0)) ≥
1
10
·RHC(1/2,D2(F )/4) ≥ 1
640
· RHC(1/2,D2(F )).
Finally,
P (F ) =
1
6
∑
σ∈S3
P (F σ) ≥ 1
6
· P (F σ0) > 1
5000
·RHC(1/2,D2(F )).
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
The generalization to k alternatives for all k ≥ 3 follows immediately by applying Theorem 4.2
to any subset of three alternatives.
5 Tightness of Results
In this section we show that for GSWFs on three alternatives, the assertions of Theorems 1.3
and 1.5 are tight up to logarithmic factors. In all our examples below, the Boolean choice
functions f, g, h of the GSWF F are monotone threshold functions, that is, functions of the
form:
(f(x) = 1)⇔
(
n∑
i=1
xi ≥ l
)
, (44)
for different values of l. We note that in ([19], Theorem 2.9), Mossel et al. showed that amongst
neutral GSWFs on three alternatives, a GSWF based on the majority rule is the “most rational”
in the asymptotic sense (i.e., has the least probability of non-transitive outcome as the number of
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voters tends to infinity). To some extent, our examples generalize this result to general GSWFs
on three alternatives. The examples show that GSWFs based on monotone threshold Boolean
choice functions are “close to be the most rational” amongst GSWFs whose choice functions
have the same expectations, in the sense that their probability of non-transitive outcome is
logarithmic close to the lower bound. In fact, we conjecture that such GSWFs are indeed the
most rational amongst GSWFs whose choice functions have the same expectations. However,
such exact result is not known even for neutral GSWFs.
We use the following proposition of Mossel et al. [18], showing that Borell’s reverse Bonami-
Beckner inequality is essentially tight for diametrically opposed Hamming balls. Since we use
the proposition only for noise of rate ǫ = 1/3, we state it in this particular case.
Theorem 5.1 ( [18], Proposition 3.9). Fix s, t > 0, and let fn, gn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be defined
by
(fn(x) = 1)⇔
(
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ n
2
− s
2
√
n
)
, and (gn(x) = 1)⇔
(
n∑
i=1
xi ≥ n
2
+
t
2
√
n
)
.
Then
lim
n→∞
∑
S⊂{1,...,n}
(
1
3
)|S|
fˆn(S)gˆn(S) ≤
√
8/9
2πs(s/3 + t)
exp
(
−1
2
s2 + 2st/3 + t2
8/9
)
. (45)
In order to show the tightness of Theorem 1.3, we fix a constant ǫ > 0 and define the choice
functions according to Equation (44), choosing the values of l such that
E[f ] = 0, E[g] = 1− ǫ, E[h] = 1− ǫ.
It is clear that D1(F ) = ǫ. By Equation (25),
P (F ) = 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉.
By our construction, the pair of functions (1− g, h¯) is of the form considered in Theorem 5.1,
with s = t ≈
√
2 log(1/ǫ), and thus by the theorem, for n sufficiently large,
P (F ) = 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉 ≤
√
8/9
2πs(s/3 + t)
exp
(
−1
2
s2 + 2st/3 + t2
8/9
)
≈ Cǫ3 log(1/ǫ).
The lower bound asserted by Theorem 1.3 is P (F ) ≥ C ′ · ǫ3, and thus the example shows the
tightness of the assertion up to logarithmic factors.
The tightness of Theorem 1.5 is shown similarly, with choice functions chosen such that
E[f ] = ǫ, E[g] = 1− ǫ, E[h] = 1/2.
It is clear that D2(F ) = ǫ, and by Equation (25),
P (F ) ≤ 〈T1/3f ′, h〉+ 〈T1/3(1− g), h¯〉.
The pairs (f ′, h) and (1− g, h¯) are both of the form considered in Theorem 5.1, and application
of the theorem to both of them yields tightness up to a logarithmic factor, like in the previous
case.
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Finally, we note that while the examples above deal with GSWFs whose choice functions have
constant expectation, it also makes sense to consider choice functions whose expectation tends
to zero, as n (the number of voters) tends to infinity. In particular, one may ask what is the least
possible probability of non-transitive outcome, as function of n, for GSWFs with D1(F ) > 0 or
D2(F ) > 0. It appears that the question is of interest mainly for D2(F ), as for D1(F ), one can
easily check that the minimal possible probability of 6−n is obtained by a GSWF whose choice
functions are chosen according to Equation (44), such that
E[f ] = 0, E[g] = 1− 2−n, E[h] = 1− 2−n.
For D2(F ), it was shown in [17] that for a GSWF whose choice functions are chosen according
to Equation (44), such that
E[f ] = 2−n, E[g] = 1− 2−n, E[h] = 1/2,
we have P (F ) ≤ 0.471n. Furthermore, it was conjectured that this is the most rational GSWF
on three alternatives that satisfies the assumptions of Arrow’s theorem (and in particular, the
minimal possible probability 6−n is not obtained). Our results show that this function is at
least “close” to be the most rational, as by Theorem 1.5, for any GSWF F such that D2(F ) > 0,
we have
P (F ) ≥ C ·RHC(1/2, 2−n) ≈ C · 0.458n.
6 Questions for Further Research
We conclude this paper with several open problems related to our results.
• Our main lemma (Lemma 3.2) gives an essentially tight lower bound on the probability of
non-transitive outcome for GSWFs in which at least one of the Boolean choice functions
is “close” to a constant function. In the case where the distance from constant functions
is greater than a fixed constant, our technique fails, and we use Mossel’s theorem [20]
instead. As a result, the constant multiplicative factor in the assertions of Theorems 1.3
and 1.5 is extremely small, and clearly non-optimal. It will be interesting to find a “direct”
proof also for GSWFs whose Boolean choice functions are “far” from constant functions,
thus removing the reliance of the proof on the non-linear invariance principle (used in
Mossel’s argument) that seems “unnatural” in our context, and improving the constant
factor.
• While the results of Kalai [14] and Mossel [20] hold also for more general distributions
of the individual preferences called “even product distributions” or “symmetric distri-
butions” (see [17, 20]), our proof does not extend directly to such distributions. The
reason is that for highly biased distributions of the preferences, the lower bound obtained
by Borell’s reverse Bonami-Beckner inequality is weaker, and cannot “beat” the upper
bound obtained by the Bonami-Beckner inequality. Thus, obtaining a tight quantitative
version of Arrow’s theorem for general even product distributions of the preferences is an
interesting open problem.
• We believe that GSWFs whose Boolean choice functions are monotone threshold functions
are the most rational amongst GSWFs whose choice functions have the same expectations,
not only in the asymptotic sense, but also for any particular (large enough) n. However,
this conjecture seems quite challenging, as it includes the Majority is Stablest conjecture
(whose proof by Mossel et al. [19] holds only in the limit as n→∞).
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• Another direction of research is using our techniques to obtain quantitative versions of
other theorems in social choice theory. In [8], Friedgut et al. presented a quantitative
version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [11, 21] for neutral GSWFs on three alter-
natives. Recently, Isaksson et al. [12] generalized the result of [8] to neutral GSWFs on k
alternatives, for all k ≥ 4. One of the main ingredients in the proof of [8] is Kalai’s quan-
titative Arrow theorem for neutral GSWFs. It seems interesting to find out whether our
quantitative version of Arrow’s theorem can lead to a quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem for general GSWFs (without the neutrality assumption).
• Finally, our results (as well as the previous results of Kalai [14] and Mossel [20]) apply
only to GSWFs that satisfy the IIA condition, since such GSWFs can be represented by
their Boolean choice functions, which allows to use the tools of discrete harmonic analysis.
It will be very interesting to find a quantitative version of Arrow’s theorem that will not
assume the IIA condition, but rather will relate the probability of non-transitive outcome
to the distance of the GSWF from satisfying IIA.
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